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Financing Local Public Services
Introduction
Sector policies, decentralization, and public services
The paper deals with the financial and organizational structure of local
public services with a special attention to the transitional countries.
Public services can be defined as the services which are produced for
the benefit of the whole society, i.e. the goods whose consumption
yields collective benefits. Public services do not necessarily mean the
services provided by the public sector, but rather the services normally
thought to be the responsibility of the government. Primary education,
typically a government responsibility, can be provided through non-
government institutions, e.g. private schools. There are more and more
areas where the public institutions are replaced by private organizations
while the regulatory task remain at the level of central or local
governments (other examples are child-care centers, social-care
institutions, e.g. old people's homes, etc.). This is especially important in
transitional countries with the legacy of the state-dominated society
where therewas no room for the private institutions in public services.
The overall economic and sector policies of the government (such as
educational policy, housing policy, health care system, etc.) define the
public role in a given area. The countries which went through the
transition after 1990 had to transform their centrally planned economies
into the market economy. The public sector reform proposal had to
redefine which public services the government wanted to have provided
for the society, and which regulative and financial means could provide
them. The basic question the transitional countries had to face was the
scope of the government responsibilities that is, how the government
can decrease its direct role in economy, especially in the provision of
public services. This task required the sector policies with major
restructuring programs which could include the elements of
privatization, new financial structures, and redesigned responsibilities.
Most countries found this public sector reform politically difficult to carry
out (Kornai, 2000).
The decentralization required that sub-national governments - in line
with the national macro policy - provide a wide range of public services
with local relevance (housing, public transportation, social services,
education, etc.). The range of public services, transferred to the sub-
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national governments, varies from country to country. The
decentralisation process reformulates the intergovernmental finance.
Expenditure and revenue assignments were restructured, which
typically increased both the responsibility and autonomy of local
governments. A real decentralization is critical to eliminate the soft
budget constraint that encourages local government representatives to
try to maximize the central grants (rent-seeking strategy), while
downplaying the performance of local services.
Local public services can be analysed from twoaspects:
a) administrative and management characteristics (taxation,
bookkeeping, proprietary rights, control, legal standing in terms of
labour affairs) and
b) financing models (costs, revenue alternatives, and a mechanism to
create a “balance” between the two).
The financial and organizational structure of local public services differs
from sector to sector. The public sector reforms in transitional countries
created a new legal and financial framework for the local service
provision. This includes the scope of the autonomy of local governments
to influence the organizational structure, the user charges, the
competition, etc. The social services (education, social care, health) and
communal services (transportation, housing, water etc.) have very
different “natures”.
Alternative servicedelivery systems
After the 1990s, the changes in the organizational structures in
Hungary were influenced not only by the well-known legal
requirements, but also by the new responsibilities of local
governments introduced by sectoral laws (e.g. fire protection). In
several cases the incentives built in the tax and grant policies urged
the local governments to restructure their service delivery system.
The institutional changes were supported by local interest (lobby)
groups as well. Municipalities provide services through various
forms of organization: (a) Mayor's Office; (b) budgetary institutions
(e.g. schools); (c) business organizations in fullmunicipal ownership
or foundations created purely by municipalities; (d) joint ventures
(with a minimum 25% stake in it); (e) predominantly private firms or
companies that arenotmunicipally owned.
Source:Hegedüs, 2004
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The observers of these processes supposed that there was a single-
direction progress through which municipalities - in order to find more
and more efficient solutions - move from a government-dominated
structure towards a structure where the direct public service provision is
replaced by the more efficient non-government solutions. (that
approach proved to be one-sided for several reasons: it fails to take into
consideration the fact that without a proper regulatory environment the
efficiency of the new institutional forms will be questionable). In
Hungary, the development of the “regulatory background” did not
precede contracting out, privatisation of services, transferring public
service delivery to foundations and “one-person” limited liability
companies. There were examples when the only reason for the new -
off-budget - organizational solution was to escape from the constraints
of the budgetary control. The advantage of non-profit organizations over
the public institutions is their independence and flexibility in financial
management (financing wages, taxation). In the area of typical
communal services, the municipal companies were replaced by the
private companies (owned partly or totally by the local governments) in
order to provide more manoeuvring space for service improvement
(access to capital market). The involvement of non-governmental
agencies in public services raises the question of financial sustainability.
NGOs in social services are almost entirely dependent on the
government, thus their financial stability is questionable.
However, the regulatory background does not only mean laws, such as
price regulation, procurement law, etc., but the emergence of
behavioural norms and the enforcement of the law as well. The
importance of the organizational structure is that it affects the efficient
use of financial resources through the incentive structure and
behavioural norms. The institutional framework and the design of these
financial means define the incentives and the room for maneuvering
both for the local/central government and the service providers in the
provision of public services. The relation between the government and
the service provider can be described as a principal-agent problem (Le
Grand, 2002). The key organizational question is the relation between
the government (principal) and the service provider. The relation could
be defined within the government sector, which happens when the
budgetary institutions provide the services. For example, the relation
between the school management and the local government in Hungary
is determined through the educational programme and the budget. In
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the case of off-budget institutions , the relations are defined by the
contract which may stipulate some kind of risk-sharing procedures
besides the price and the quality of the services.
Financing public services requires reimbursing the service provider,
whether it is provided through a budgetary institution, a municipal
company or a private entity. Public services can be funded through user
charges and/or grants. The service provider may have a relation to the
central government and/or the local government. The next figure
focusing on the household sector shows themain funding sources.
The service provider gets revenue from the user charges , from the
grants provided by local governments and from the central government
grants (the source of the grants are the taxes paid by the users). The
households (users) pay taxes and get income support from local and
central governments. Local governments finance their grants (and
income support) from local taxes and central grants. The key question is
what kind of incentives for the service provider are created through the
financing and organizational arrangements.
The chapter will focus on the basic funding structure of the services
related to the institutional environment of service provision .
In the first part we deal with the problems of user charges.After clarifying
the economic background and the different types of user charges, we
examine the different methods whose aim is to increase the paying
capacity of the households. This is very important in transitional
countries, where the household capacity to pay for the services is
limited. At the end of the first part we discuss the different incentives
related to user charges including the “informal pricing”.
The second part of the chapter focuses on grants.After summarizing the
main economic justification in using grants for financing public services
we will deal with the grants which go directly to the service provider and
the grants which go first to the local government and are afterwards
forwarded to the service provider. The main message of this part is that
the local institutional structure has an effect on the efficiency of the
grants structure.
1
2
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1 The financial data (turnover, revenues, and expenditures) of service providers outside local
governments are off-budget institutions. It means that their budget, although they are owned by
local governments, is not part of the local government budgets.
2 User charges are the charges for the goods or the services that the user is required to pay. There is
a link between the payment and the service provided, but it may vary considerably in terms of the
degree of “cost-recovery” (Bailey, 1998, p. 126). The tax, as an alternative financing method, is an
“unrequited transfer” and there is no relation between the paid amount and the service provided.
Our interest is limited to the operational part, especially the user charges and the grants, and its
relation to the organizational structure of service delivery; thus in this chapter we do not deal with
the issues of capital investment.
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Figure 1: Funding sourcesof localpublic services
User charges
1. Economics and politics of user charges
User charges have played an increasing role in the financing of local
governments in recent decades in the OECD countries, but this is a
relatively new financial technique .
According to the economic theory, the appropriate policy is clearly to
charge the correct price based on roughly the long-run marginal cost
criteria (Bailey, 1995). Only thus will the correct amounts and types of
service be provided to the right people - that is those willing to pay for
them. Efficiency thus demands user charges to be levied wherever
feasible. It is often suggested, however, that equity considerations
argue against user charges. “Although in principle the incidence of user
charges is no more relevant than the ultimate incidence of the price of
cheese, studies in different countries have shown that the distributive
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4 However, there is greater disparity in the administration and collection of user charges and fees.
Full information on revenues is not available only through the analysis of sub-national government
accounts, because the significant part of user charges are collected through off-budget institutions
In particular, for user charges and according to the organization of service provision, the revenues
may be recorded in the accounts of private companies contracted by the public sector, in the
accounts of companies wholly or partly owned by the local government(s) or by departments within
the local government administration. Thus it is very difficult to get precise comparative data about
the use of user charges in the local government sector.
Typesofuser charges
At least three types of user charges can be differentiated: (1) service
fees, (2) public prices, and (3) specific benefit charges. Service fees
include such itemsas license fees (marriage, business, dogs, vehicles)
and various small charges levied by local governments for
performing specific services - registering this or providing a copy of
that - for identifiable individuals (or businesses). In effect, such fees
constitute cost reimbursement from the private to the public sector.
In contrast, public prices refer to the revenues received by local
governments from the sale of private goods and services (other than
the cost-reimbursement just described). All sales of locally provided
services to identifiable private agents - from public utility charges to
admission charges to recreation facilities - fall under this general
heading. In principle, such prices should be set at the competitive
private level, with no tax or subsidy element included unless doing
so is themost efficientwayof achievingpublic policy goals, and even
then it is best if the tax-subsidy element is accounted for separately.
A third category of charge revenue may be called specific benefit
taxes. Such revenues are distinct from service fees and public prices
because theydonot arise from theprovision or sale of a specific good
or service to an identifiableprivate agent.Unlike thepriceswhich are
voluntarily paid - although like the fees paid for services that may be
required by law - taxes represent compulsory contributions to local
revenues. Nonetheless, specific benefit taxes are (at least in theory)
related in some way to the benefits received by the taxpayer in
contrast to such general benefit taxes as fuel taxes levied on road
users as a class or local general business orproperty taxesviewedas a
price paid for local collective goods (see below). Examples abound in
local finance: special assessments, land value-increment taxes,
improvement taxes, front-footage levies, supplementary property
taxes related to the provision of sewers or street lighting,
development exactions and charges, delineation levies, and so on.
Most such charges are imposed either on the assessed value of real
property or on some characteristic of that property - its area, its
frontage, its location.
Source: Bird, 2001
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consequences of charging for local public services may even be
progressive. In any case, attempting to rectify fundamental
distributional problems through inefficiently pricing scarce local
resources is almost always a bad idea, resulting in little if any equity
being purchased at a high price in efficiency terms.” (Bird, 2001, p 6.).
There is some confusion about the precise distinction between the user
charges and the local taxes. Of course there are revenue sources which
clearly fall into the tax category (e.g. sales, income and property taxes).
Other revenues, such as park entrance fees, sewer charges, and
highway tolls - payments for government services used - clearly fall into
the user charge category. But there are also numerous examples of
revenue sources that are not so easily categorized, because the actual
financial design of the fee better fits the tax category. For example, the
fee for garbage collection levied compulsory on every property
(“garbage tax”) is closer to the taxes than the user charges. On the other
hand, some taxes levied on the areas of development are closer to the
benefit prices than a typical tax (this is called impact fee, and is levied,
for example, in an area of development to share the cost of the
infrastructure investment).
Different types of services have different potential for “charging”. The
“economic nature” of the services sets the limits to the use of user
charges. One way of justifying the differences in public pricing is the
categorization of the services into the “need”, “protective”, “amenity“ or
'facility' services (Bailey, 1999, p 133). The services related to the
“needs”, such as social services (income benefit programmes, housing
allowances, etc.) are fully funded from the central or the local resources,
while on the other extreme, the facility services (like photocopying) are
fully funded from the user charges. The “protective” programmes are the
services close to the need approach, e.g. shelters for the homeless,
school meals, etc. and the “amenity” programmes (e.g. special classes)
are financed as a combination of the grants and the user charges.
The other rationalization of the application of user charges is the
external benefit of the programmes. If the whole benefit is reaped by the
user of the services, the full cost recovery is justified; if themajority of the
benefit is derived at the community level, the subsidy is justified.
However, the “charging” policy is loosely connected to the economic
principles. The sector strategies establish the framework for the
possible direction in public pricing policy. For example, the possible role
of student fees in financing education is a question for the central
government not for the local government or its institutions. But among
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the limits set by the sector policies and the legal framework, local
institutions could have an important role.
The applicability of user charges depends very much on other factors,
such as enforcement, collection method, measurability, etc. (see
possible options in the area ofwaste collection, in the next box).
Revenue raisingpossibilities inwastemanagement
User charges are commonly utilized to recover a portion of the costs
of solid waste management from those generating the waste. User
charges can generate substantial revenues and provide incentives to
minimize waste, especially if structured so that those who pollute
more, pay more ("polluter pays principle"). Although user charges
can be imposed at different stages of solid waste management
(including collection and disposal), in many cities they do not cover
the full costs of solid waste management activities. While citizens
and enterprises are generally willing to pay for solid waste to be
collected, they are often unwilling to pay the full cost of disposing of
the waste in a sanitary manner. Experience in many countries has
shown that charging the full costs of disposal may create incentives
for littering and open dumping, especially if the enforcement of
regulatory standards (i.e. no dumping) is weak and entities can
avoidpaying theuser chargebydisposingof thewaste themselves.
Analysis of the financial records of many developing country cities
shows that current practices for cost recovery for solidwaste are very
weak (recovery rates of less than 10 percent are not uncommon) and
have substantial scope for improvement.Options to recover the costs
associated with solid waste management range from instituting or
enhancing garbage taxes, collecting tipping fees, or relying on other
general revenues (including the property tax and business licenses).
Choosing among these options depends upon the relative
importance of various criteria: whether revenues are adequate and
easily collected, whether the polluter pays for the damage inflicted,
whether the option is politically acceptable, andwhether payment of
the revenue canbe enforced.
User chargeoption:
"Garbage Tax": The garbage tax is typically a flat tax collected with
other taxes, such as the community tax. It can be supplemented with
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a tax on establishments and products that generate garbage, for
example, tax on plastic packages, restaurants and similar services
should be levied. This is tax because the payments are not
proportional with the quantity of the services. It can generate
adequate revenues if rates are set based on costs, and are updated as
needed. It is often collected with property tax because direct
collection is expensive (about 10-13% of total costs). The “polluter
pays” principle is valid only to the extent that the rate depends on
surrogate for waste generation, like lot size and property value. It
requires political will to set and update rates. It is difficult to
withhold services fornon-payment.
Volume or Weight Based Fees:
to
dispose. It generates adequate revenues as long as fees are set based
on costs and updated as needed. It is difficult to collect, however,
because it requires sophisticated refuse collection system. It fits to
the “polluter pays” principle, but politically raises difficulties. Leads
to dumping behaviour without local inspection and enforcement
capacity.
Tipping Fees (for unloading waste at a landfill, transfer station or
recycling facility): Substantial revenue if based on full costs of
investment and operation. If weight-bridges are utilized, it is easy to
collect. The “polluter pays” principle is followed, if hauler to waste
generator passes on fees. Municipalities are often reluctant to pay
fair share. Enforceable, butmust verify that trucksgo todisposal site.
Other revenue options can also be taken into consideration such as
property taxes, business licenses, utility surcharges, orGeneral Fund
Subsidies (including transfers).
Source:WorldBank5
The utility surcharge represents an interesting case when “general
taxes” are paid through the fee for public services. One of the reasons
for this is that the willingness to pay is higher for the fees for public
services than for the taxes.
Volume-Based Fees mean that the fee
depends on the quantity measured as volume or weight of the waste
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2. Increasing household capacity to pay for services
An important way of financing public services is to subsidize users
through different programmes. These programmes demand side
subsidies, while the grants transferred to the service providers can be
considered as the “supply side” programmes.
In the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe, housing allowances
were the critical element in public sector finances. Housing allowances
are demand-side subsidies, usually in the form of a discount on the bill
the resident receives for public sector services (water, district heating,
housing, etc.). They are typically provided on a means-tested basis to
low-income families to help them pay these costs; generally they are
structured so that poorer households receive larger benefits. Housing
allowances were widely adopted in the region (see Lux, 2003, Katsura
and Romanik, 2002, Lykova et al. 2004). The demand side programmes
can be financed 1. from the central budget, 2. from the local
governments' budgets or 3. from the budget of the service provider.
Typically the uniform housing allowance programmes are financed from
the central budget, but there are examples for some matching schemes
as well. In Hungary (until 2004) the housing allowances were financed
from the local governments' general revenues. The service providers
can contribute to the funds designed to help low-income households
(see next box).
The demand side subsidies are the most important techniques to
manage the problem of the low-income households in the transitional
countries.Apart from this solution (which can be termed the target group
solution) there are methods which try to control the demand through a
modification of the user charges (tariff solution). Through the “user
charge specification” (giving allowances to a certain group of users) the
demand for public services can be increased or maintained (at the time
of economic recession). These are indirect subsidies typically paid by
the “good payers”. The experience of the transitional countries has
showed that the problem of low-income households cannot be solved
without increasing the end use efficiency (Hegedüs, 2003). The critical
point is the efficiency of public service companies, that is the “end-use”.
If the companies are not under any pressure to improve their efficiency,
the efficient pricing supplemented with a housing allowance system will
not guarantee the best use of public resources.
According to the public finance literature the programmes which involve
income redistribution (e.g. housing allowances) should be financed from
the central budget. In most cases, local governments manage the
income subsidy programmes through the matching grant systems. It
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means that a certain share of cost (5-20 %) is paid from local budgets,
which gives an incentive to a more careful selection of the recipients of
the programme.
The ultimate funding sources of local public services are the user
charges and the grants/transfers. Thismeans that each service provider
has to recover its cost through the user charges paid by the beneficiaries
of the services and some kind of the transfers either from the public
sector (local or central government) or private donations. The lack of
real decentralization (expenditure and revenue autonomy) led to the
BudapestUtilityAllowancesScheme
The Municipality of Budapest has set up a foundation ( popularly
called the Compensation Fund). Its board of directors consists of the
delegates of the servicing companies, the representatives from the
city's Assembly and the members of certain civic organizations.
Under its statutes, the service companies (i.e. water supply, sewage,
solid waste disposal, and district heating companies) transfer 1-2
percent of their sales returns to the Foundation (this contribution
amounts to nearly 10 percent of the arrears). The companies are
granted special tax exemptions based on these public utility
transfers. It is the public utility companies' basic business interest to
keep the arrears at a level that does not jeopardize their daily
operations or the provision of their long-term services. These
companies regard their contribution to the Foundation as a business
technique aimed at reducing their losses and also as a guarantee for
the smooth continuation of their services (as will be seen, these
contributions are directly linked to the companies' attempts to
preserve their consumers' willingness to pay). The programme
envisages granting the district heating allowances to the households
in the lowest tenth of the income scale (maximum 25.000
households) andwater, sewage, andwaste disposal allowances to 50
percent of the households in the lowest tenth of the income scale
(40.000 households). Consequently, the allowances tend to cover
around15-20percent of theutility bills perhousehold.
Source:Gyori, 2003
3. User charges and incentives
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“no-cost recovery” situation, which inevitably caused a huge service
level decline (Hegedüs, 2003).
The institutional setting of the service sector (education, health care,
social, utilities etc.) has an effect on the mechanism of setting user
charges. The first question is which level of government is responsible
for “setting” the prices. To set the prices typically means procedures, or
an approval process through which the service provider will be given the
“price” of services. In some cases these are very simple procedures,
when a law or a government decree defines the prices. For example, the
Informalpricing
Donations and voluntary contributions for public purposes are
another type of revenue. In principle, no return for this contribution
is given. The social and the educational sectors often benefit from
donations. Service providers under fiscal pressure want to increase
their revenues, but try to keep them as off-budget revenues.
Typically donors can write off their donations from their tax base,
which gives an incentive to the institutions to raise money through
foundations, even if they replace regular user charges. In Hungary
many schools finance special services through “foundations”.
Parents pay the fees for the courses to the schools' foundations.
Extra-curricular language courses, tennis classes, for instance, are
financed in this way. Another example is The “Clever Love”
Foundation of the children's day care center in Berettyóújfalu
registered in 1995. The objectives of the foundation were 1. to
promote the integration of the kindergarten education into the
school education; 2. to develop the children's skills by means of
special activities that do not constitute part of the regular education
(crafts workshops, drama groups, physical education etc.); 3. to
purchase additional equipment (e.g. sport equipment, a small
weaving loom,books,musical instruments); 4. topay for the teachers
of extra-curricular activities. The board of the foundation decides on
the use of the financial support and the proceeds, considering the
objectives specified in the foundation deed. The payment is
voluntary, but almost every parent pays a smaller or bigger amount
everymonth.
Source:Hegedüs, 2004
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fees for social services (public meals, social homes, etc.) are typically
defined through government decrees. In other cases, the government
has only a “regulatory” role, which sometimes means that they have a
strong say in the pricing process, but the government does not always
have the capacity to exercise any real control over the pricing, and
different levels of government can share the responsibility for pricing.
The formal role of service providers in pricing is limited. However, in
practice, service providers make the proposal for the change of the
prices, and through this process they can have an influence.
In social services where the equity is an issue, the service providers
have a very limited influence in the decision of the user charges.
However, there are informal ways to increase the effective contribution
of the user to finance services (e.g. donations and voluntary
contributions).
In the public utility sector most of the countries in the region have
delegated the pricing functions to local governments, but the real
influence depends on several other things. For example, the pricing
procedure is very important in itself as well. In some countries in the
region, the local government units have the right to set the tariff, but they
Setting tariff inBudapestPublicTransportation
Public transportation in Hungary is a local responsibility. In
Budapest, theMunicipality ofBudapest has the right to set the tariffs.
However, the central government subsidizes the public
transportation bypaying the tariff allowances for the pensioners and
the students. The size of the transfers depends on the tariff: the
higher the tariff, the higher the subsidy. The procedure is that first
the assemblydecides on theproposalmadeby the city-ownedPublic
Transportation Company, but because of the government subsidy,
the tariff changes have to be approved by the central government, as
well. Right after the transition, the new assembly opposed the tariff
increase for political reasons, sacrificing the state subsidy (the tariff
at that time covered 40% of the cost of the public transportation). In
2003, when the city decided on a substantial tariff increase, it was the
central government that rejected the approval of the increased tariff.
Source: BKV (BudapestTransportCompany)
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have to be approved by the central government or by the relevant central
government agency. There are some cases when the central
government gives a subsidy proportional to the tariff to the service
provider (see previous box).
In this case, the right of central governments to give or withhold its
approval, that is, to share the responsibility for pricing, is
understandable. Service companies need security, especially if they
make long-term investments, because they can incur losses if their
services are underpriced. The law defines the procedures or accounting
rules which again - depending on how enforceable the laws are - could
limit the manoeuvring room for an organisation with the price-setting
rights.
Governments struggle with the rising service spending and the user
charges represent a possible incentive mechanism to control the costs.
A recent study (Borge and Rattso, 2004) indicated that 30-40% of any
cost increase is passed on to consumers in the form of higher user
charges. Moreover, user charge financing has a significant negative
effect on the unit cost.An increase in the user charge financing by 10 %-
points is expected to reduce the unit cost by 6-9%.
In countries around the world, the costs of public services are often
shared between those who use them (i.e. households, commercial and
industrial establishments) and governments. The government cost-
sharing arrangements include matching the grants of the higher
government levels and the general fund subsidies from local
governments. In Hungary, matching grants are used, for example, in
local government benefit programmes, where 80% of the programme
cost is paid by the central government and 20 % by the local
government. An example of the general fund subsidy (in financing
education) is a grant based on the standard cost of a student and
typically finances 70-80%of the cost.
Matching grants are used to induce local governments to provide a
socially and environmentally desirable level of public services. Without
these grants, the level of the output of the services would be lower than
the social optimum. General fund subsidies reecognize the public good
and equity aspects, i.e. with the help of the grants each municipality is
Grants
1. Economic effects of grants
6
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6 Matching grants are the grants with the specification that the amount transferredmust bematched
by the local funds.
able to secure a minimum level of its public services. An adequate cost
recovery (supported by the grants) is the key to both the sustainability
and the private sector participation in service provision.
The basic question of the public policy related to the grant structure is
the possible effect of the grant design on the response of the sub-
national government and the service providers to the grants. If we can
answer this question, the criteria of an efficient grant system can be
defined. The “theory of grants” examines how different kinds of grants
should affect the budgetary behaviour of the lower levels of government.
Gramlich (1977) identified three types of grants which have - on the
basis of the grant theory - different consequences, and studied the
empirical evidence supporting the theory. The Case A grant (the open-
ended matching grant) is suited to capture the spill-over benefits
because it subsidizes the supply of public services where the benefit
goes over the boundary of the sub-national government. The Case B
grant (the close-ended lump-sum grant) compensates for the difference
in income levels and consequently public services. The Case C grant
(the close-ended categorical grant) is supposed to provide theminimum
service or spending levels for different government- provided goods and
services.
Empirical research has partly corroborated the “grant theory”. However,
research has highlighted the criteria for bad grants (Bahl, 2000). The
reasons for “bad grants” fall into four categories. The first is to
discourage local government autonomy. That is, the central government
is unwilling to give up control over governance that would come with
ceding the revenue-raising powers to local governments. As an
alternative, intergovernmental transfers are given as a local
government revenue source. The second reason might be an attempt to
maintain or enforce uniformity. The goal of the central governmentmight
be to resist diversity on the part of local governments, in terms of
expenditure mix or revenue structure. The third reason could be a belief
that local governments are more corrupt than the central government,
and therefore a shift of responsibility to subnational governments would
lead to a waste of revenues. There is some grain of truth in the claim that
local government officials are more susceptible to fall under the
influence of local citizens because they are closer to the local electorate.
Fourth, a transfer system may be put in place as part of the strategy to
offload the budget deficit on to the local governments. For example, a
grant system may be put in place but become underfunded at a later
point when the central budget is pressed.
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2.Grants at service provider level
Grants to service providers can be based on a standard (normative)
procedure or can be negotiated.
The example for the first solution are the grants based on the standard
cost. It means that the transfer only covers a certain standard cost. If
local expenditure exceeds this amount, a reduced grant - or no grant at
all - is given. The standard cost solution frequently has no close relation
to the actual cost, which is typically higher than the standard. In this
case, the grant based on the standard cost is a matching grant, where
thematching rate depends on the actual cost.
The grants based on the actual cost are typically negotiated, and no limit
as to the standard costs or the like exists. It means that the actual cost
minus the user charges are funded through the grant (see next box).
The importance of these two methods lies in their effects on the
organizational incentives. In the first case, economic rationality pushes
Water sector subsidy inHungary
The Hungarian government has phased out a large part of water
sector subsidies from the state budget since beginning to move
towards a market economy in 1989. The subsidy reduction in the
water sector is significant. The major steps taken by the Hungarian
government to reduce the high state budgetary subsidy for water
include decentralizing the responsibility of the central government
for providing public water services and raising water tariffs. The
central government has legally transferred water supply facilities to
local authorities, along with ownership of existing water assets.
Water tariffs have been raised to the level based on a formula that
includes the cost of inputs, depreciation, maintenance, and a return
of assets. As a consequence of the decentralization, the 33 water
companies were disintegrated into 250 companies, and the price
differences increased greatly. To compensate for the high
production cost in certain areas of the country, the central budget
allocated a fund (3 billion in 2003) to reimburse the service producer
with high production costs. According to the grant formula, the
difference between the production cost and the maximum price set
by thegovernment is given to the companies.
Source: Papp, 1999
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organizations to economize with the cost and to restructure their
services towards the better-paying activities. The second solution could
lead to a sub-optimum situation as well. In the negotiation process
(because of the asymmetric information issue ) the service provider
could withold the facts, which makes it impossible to control the actual
expenditure. The general rule is that the standard cost solution is more
efficient if the risk of opportunism is limited or if it is too expensive to get a
“tight budget control” (contract procedures could improve this situation).
Cross-subsidies can play an important role in financing certain services.
One of the typical examples is the housing service when the rents do not
cover maintenance costs, and the Public Management Companies use
non-housing revenues (rent for commercial property) to cover the loss
on the residential units. The important factor here is that cross-
subsidizing is not the decision of the service provider but of the local
government (principal). However, larger institutions, which have more
than one task, frequently use the techniques of cross-subsidies.
In the decentralised system, service providers get the transfers from
local governments. However, this does not necessarily mean that local
governments have real decision-making powers on the use of the
grants. The pass-through grantmeans thatmoney is transferred by local
governments directly to service providers. In this case, grants are a part
of local budgets, but local governments do not have the discretionary
right on the use of the funds. In Hungary, the typical pass-through grants
are the fund from the National Health Fund or the grant to the Fire-
Fighter Services.
9
3.Grants at local government level
Thegrant typology
There are several ways to classify . Transfers mean financial
flows from the central level to the subnational level. They have two
basic forms: revenue sharing and grants. is a
nationwide based taxes and rates, but within a fixed proportion of
the tax revenue (on a tax-by-tax basis or on the basis of a “pool” of
different tax sources) being allocated to the subnational government,
based on (1) the revenue accruing within each jurisdiction (also
called the derivation principle) or (2) other criteria, typically
transfers
Revenue sharing
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The regulator never possesses asmuch information as the service provider.9
population, expenditure needs, and/or tax capacity (Shah, 1994).
are financial resources flowing from one government
(grantor) to another government (recipient). There is very little
practical difference between the revenue sharing, if the allocation is
not based on the origin and grants. The other approach of the
taxonomy of grants is tied to the degree of the autonomy of the
subnational governments to use the transfer. In the case of
, no strings are attached to the use of the
money. The (or ) grant defines exactly how the
money is used, and provides financial help for particular services.
Between these extremes are the , which can be used freely
on a defined functional area. The block grant can be spent in a broad
area of local government service, such as urban development, with
recipient governments having substantial autonomy to decide on
the specific use to which the funds are actually put.
require the recipient local government to provide, according to the
matching rate, their own share to the services supported. Matching
categorical grants match expenditure on a specific grant-aided
service. Matching grants can be , which
means that the pool of the grant is determined or left open.
are typically unconditional transfers and are related to
the revenue effort of the local government. The revenue effort is
usually measured in terms of tax effort: the greater the revenue is
raised from local taxes, themoregrant the local government receives.
The grants can be allocated as an or can be
Local governments can be granted an entitlement to a specific
amount of funds provided that they submit a proposal, which
satisfies the funding criteria for approval by the central government.
In the case of competitive grants the local governments compete
against one other by submitting requests which best meet the central
government funding criteria.
Sources: LGI/WBI, 2003
Grants
unconditional transfers
conditional categorical
block grants
Matching grants
open ended or close ended
Effort
related grants
entitlement competitive.
With pass-through grants the incentive structure is embodied in the
contract between the central government and the grant's beneficiary.
Thus it could be based on the standard cost regulation or the negotiated
budget (in Hungary, for example, hospitals are financed through the
standard cost method, while the Fire Service relies more on the
negotiated budget).
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Local governments have general purpose grants which can be used for
any legitimate purpose, in the same way as the their own tax revenues.
However, formula grants allocated on the basis of objective criteria (e.g.
some measures of taxable capacity and/or expenditure needs) are
frequently general-purpose grants, if their use is not earmarked (see
previous box).
General purpose grants can be allocated on the formula basis or ad hoc
basis. The formula usually includes the variables that reflect the
variation in the need and the cost across jurisdiction; sometimes the
formulas compensate for the low fiscal capacity or reward a high fiscal
effort. The formula that uses with high weight the number of the
beneficiaries of certain services means that the grant is conditional. The
reason is that the grants typically do not cover the total cost of the
services and de facto require from local governments to co-finance the
service. The grant formula in this case includes the “per beneficiary”
factor. Consequently, if the grant per beneficiary is lower than the actual
cost of the services per user, the grant is earmarked independently of
the fact that cost-sharing is not legally required.
Normatives inHungary
For the performance of their mandatory responsibilities, local
governments are automatically entitled to normative contributions
from the central budget. This, however, is not a form of task-
financing, as the spending of such subsidies is not subject to
restrictions. A local government decides at its own discretion how
much it spends onwhat tasks. Initially (in 1990), global contributions
dominated (relating at first to the total number of residents, later to
the number of individuals in the various age groups). Later on,
however, the share of contributions based on the indicators of more
concrete tasks (number of children in créches, kindergartens,
primary and secondary schools, those using the services of student
hostels, social institutions, etc.) made up an increasing part of the
total funding. The aim of this, however, was to improve the
allocation of such funding from the central budget among local
governments. There is only one item that is directly related to the
revenues collected by the local governments. Each forint of the
actually-collectedholidayaccommodation charge ismatchedby two
forints of subsidy - this makes up less than one per cent of the total
budgetary subsidies.
Source:OECD, 2001
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The third option to give grants through local governments for public
services is the specific (conditional) grant. In this case it is the local
government who has the “legal contract” to the central government.
They have to guarantee the quality and quantity of services their office or
the service provider (typically budgetary institutions) offer (the
earmarked grants are very similar to the pass-through grants).
The categorical and the general purpose grants, aswe have seen, affect
the behaviour of the local governments differently. However, the
distinction between these types of grants is artificial because of the
Grant structure anddistortions
In the current Hungarian intergovernmental transfer system, grants
are negotiated annually. The grant structure, depending on the type
of grants, in one way or another affects the economic behaviour of
local governments. As local governments try to maximize the
amountof grants they receive fromthe central government, thegrant
allocation process may distort their financial decisions resulting in a
situation where local user preferences have no or little effect on the
provision of services. The response of local governments to the grant
allocation systemcanbedescribed as optimalwhen theydiscontinue
or minimize the provision of services with low grant-to-cost ratios
and of low local priority. The grant-to-cost ratios can be low not
because of insufficient grant financing but due to the high costs
incurred by over-capacity or bad management. An example of such
behaviourwas the closingofnursery schools in the early 1990sdue to
the lack of grant financing and partly because of a smaller number of
eligible kids. Only when municipalities discontinue the provision of
the services which were badly needed by a community but received
insufficient grant financing, can their economic behaviour be
considered distorted. An extension of this type of distorted
behaviour is when municipalities reduce the scale or quality of
important local services, typically by neglecting adequate
maintenance or renovation work, or by scaling down the level of
services. Another form of municipal response to the low grant-to-
cost ratios for certain local services has been to transfer the
responsibility for theirdelivery to the county level.
Sources:Hegedüs, 2003
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“fungibility” of money. The availability of grants frees up other local
revenues that would otherwise be spent on supported public services.
So in this way there are two options: 1. local governments allow tax
reduction and make it possible for the households to increase their
individual consumption, or 2. local governments increase the
expenditure on another, non-supported area. In other words, the funds
may end up being used for any purpose even though theywere intended
for a specific one.
Local governments regulating the service providers could formulate two
strategies. The first is the
: In this case, the budget for an
institution is a projection based on the previous year's figures (plan) and
the budgetary items for institutions are a product of individual
bargaining, which can bemodified during the fiscal year according to the
changes of external and internal conditions . The other strategy tries to
give clear financial rules for service providers and base their transfers
on formula grants . In various cost elements different methods are used
to estimate the order of the magnitude of funding, depending on the
functions of the given service provider.
There are other factors as well. Contracts themselves have an effect on
the incentives, and this could modify the grant design. The “mission” of
institutions (e.g. social institutions) can also be an important factor in
explaining the behaviour of organisations, which contributes to the
outcomes (Besley andGhatak, 2003).
The financing of local public services can be reduced to instruments:
user charges and grants. The institutional framework and the design of
these financial means define the incentives and the room for
manoeuvring both for the local/central government and the service
providers in the provision of public services. The relation between the
traditional model of budgeting and financial
management based on historical cost
8
9
Conclusion: service contracts andenforcement
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This makes everyday practices rather ad hoc and substantially reduces the financial discipline of
institutions. Institutions tend to over-spend as the budget is underestimated anyway, and are not
worried if they cannot collect the planned revenues since they are overestimated anyway.A further
consequence of this practice is that they do not pay their bills, for instance utilities, and are indebted
to local government-owned companies. Clearly, this is a case of organized irresponsibility and
shows the power status of the professional /financial management of an institution how much it can
overspend. A further negative consequence of this solution or inevitable practice is that the
information for the local body of representatives is necessarily incomplete, as the apparatus and the
institutions cannot reveal the internal details of the financial management, which often violate the
spirit and sometimes the requirements of legal provisions.
In this theory, transfers for local governments should cover the difference between the expenditure
needs and the revenues capacity. Thismethod is to this idea.close
government and the service provider can be described as a principal-
agent problem (LeGrand, 2002).
The key problem in the principal-agent relation is that the agent (service
provider) can behave “opportunistically” (the principal is the political,
decision-making unit of government; the service provider can be part of
the government, such as various departments, or budgetary institutions,
independent or quasi-independent units). It means that - according to
the theory - and because of the asymmetric information, the service
provider (seeking its interest) will deviate from the behaviour prescribed
by the regulators (principal) whenever this is advantageous to him. The
regulation of the user charges and the grant structure influence the
chance of the danger of “opportunistic behaviour”.
Beyond the institutional framework (basic laws, etc.) and the financial
elements, the “service contract” and its enforcement are a determining
factor influencing the efficiency of services. The contracting should be
interpreted in a broader sense, as it includes some modern budget
methods (programme budgeting), monitoring and performance
measurement.
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